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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 1991-1992
The demands of high technology and economies of
scale1 in the communications industry have forced
the formation of the largest and most powerful cor-
porations in the country. These same demands give
communications companies the ability and incentive
to act in an exclusive or anticompetitive manner.
The economies of scale that led to the development
and preeminence of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company ("AT&T") also permitted it to
use its monopoly power in local service areas to
cross-subsidize and discriminate in competitive areas.
Government-sanctioned monopolies such as the
Communications Satellite Corporation ("Comsat")
that witness extraordinarily rapid developments in
international telecommunications do not have market
incentives to set prices in line with costs. Addition-
ally, the nature of a limited frequency spectrum
forces the government to choose selectively among fu-
ture competitors. These examples demonstrate the
importance of and the conflicts in private and public
antitrust actions both under the Sherman Antitrust
Act and the Clayton Act.
Various sectors of the government control antitrust
policy and enforcement. While Congress controls
general antitrust policy through legislation, appro-
priations and investigative hearings, the executive
branch controls the day-to-day application of the an-
titrust laws. Under Title II and Title III of the
Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
has regulatory authority over day-to-day operations
of common carriers, as well as the jurisdiction to al-
locate and license radio frequencies for a wide vari-
ety of broadcast, common carrier and private uses.'
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") administers the
antitrust laws and brings antitrust actions for the va-
rious executive agencies. 3 The Department of State
1 " 'Economies of scale' are present in the production process
when large output volumes can be produced at a lower cost per
unit then small output volumes." See Roy J. Ruffin & Paul R.
Gregory, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 745 (1983). For example,
satellite telecommunications companies require large amounts of
infrastructure and financial strength before becoming efficient
competitors.
2 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1988). For a breakdown of com-
has authority to conduct international negotiations
involving telecommunications and is charged with
encouraging competition and cooperation in the pro-
vision of international communications services.4 The
Federal Trade Commission regulates broadcast ad-
vertising. Those executive agencies and departments,
together with private parties, use the antitrust laws
to preserve competition and direct new technologies
in the rapidly developing world of communications.
This Comment will review the antitrust cases,
agency actions and legislative advancements that had
an impact on the communications field during 1991
and 1992. There were important developments in
the Bell Company Consent Decree and the PanAm-
Sat/Comsat antitrust controversy. Antitrust concerns
also arose in the mobile satellite service field in a
controversy between American Mobile Satellite Cor-
poration and Radio Satellite Corporation. Also, a
resolution in Viacom International, Inc.'s antitrust
action against Time Warner, Inc. was reached in
1992. Finally, many antitrust concerns were raised
in TCI/Tempo's application to construct a direct
broadcast satellite system. This Comment will out-
line the history and the disposition of the above con-
troversies and then discuss the effects of 1992's
events on competition and future antitrust actions.
I. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
BELL ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREE
In 1974, the Department of Justice brought an
antitrust action against AT&T. After a six-year pe-
riod of discovery, numerous pretrial motions and an
eleven month trial, the parties submitted a proposed
resolution ("Decree," "Consent Decree," "Modifica-
tion of Final Judgment" or "MFJ") to Judge Har-
old Greene in the District Court for the District of
munications regulation and enforcement, see Wiley, Katzen, and
Knauer, The Year Ahead, Congress, the FCC and Judge
Greene's Court, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND REGULA-
TION 1991, at 8 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 328, 1991).
1 15 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1988).
4 See Executive Order No. 12,046, 3 C.F.R. 164 (1978).
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Columbia.' After holding Tunney Act Proceedings,'
the district court approved the Decree with modifica-
tions on August 24, 1982.'
The DOJ brought the original action to eliminate
three specific forms of anticompetitive behavior asso-
ciated with AT&T's predivestiture practices. First,
AT&T withheld specifications and information of its
exchange systems from independent manufacturers
while providing this information to its Western Elec-
tric Company manufacturing arm.' AT&T also dis-
criminated in favor of Western Electric products in-
stead of buying cheaper, better quality products from
independent competitors.' Second, AT&T cross-sub-
sidized Western Electric research and development
through funds derived from AT&T's monopoly in
the local exchange market, passing on losses to
AT&T's local captive customers. 10 Third, AT&T
provided inferior interconnections to its intercity
competitors and superior interconnections to
AT&T's own long distance lines."
The Consent Decree forced AT&T to divest itself
' United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C.
1982), arid sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court's ap-
proval of the AT&T Plan of Reorganization in connection with
the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree is commonly referred
to as the Modification of Final Judgment or MFJ. See AT&T,
552 F. Supp at 141 n.31.
' Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h)(1988 &
Supp. 1990)). Tunney Act Proceedings are hearings to deter-
mine whether a consent decree is in the "public interest." Id.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223.
8 Id. at 160-65 (citing DOJ's Competitive Impact Statement
("CIS")). To comply with the Tunney Act, the DOJ must sub-
mit a CIS whenever it proposes to settle an antitrust action. Id.
Id.
'o Id. at 190-91. Cross-subsidization occurs when a company
uses profits derived from a governmentally-regulated monopolis-
tic industry to support operations in a competitive industry. See,
e.g., id. at 192.
n See id. at 195.
12 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525,
530-33 (D.D.C. 1987) (Triennial Review) aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.
MCI Communications Corp. v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 283
(1990).
Section II(D)(1) of the Decree prohibits the Regional
Companies from providing "interexchange telecommuni-
cations services." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. "Inter-
exchange telecommunications" is defined as "telecommu-
nications between a point or points located in one
exchange telecommunications area and a point or points
located in one or more other exchange areas or a point
outside an exchange area." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229.
"Exchange areas," for purposes of the Decree, are the Lo-
of its local exchange services in order to eliminate
cross-subsidization.12 Additionally, the Decree pre-
vented the Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs"),'3 which inherited these local exchange
companies, from participating in certain lines-of-
business embodied in section II(D) of the Decree. 14
The Decree also provided for a Triennial Review by
the DOJ and the court to review possible changed
circumstances that would make these lines-of-busi-
ness restrictions unnecessary.1 5
Since the acceptance of the Decree and the divesti-
ture, Judge Greene has received numerous requests
for waivers and interpretations of the Modification
of Final Judgment. Soon after the district court ap-
proved AT&T's divestiture of its Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs"), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that the Decree and the
lines-of-business restrictions applied to the seven
RBOCs as well. 6 The court also held that the
RBOCs could provide extra-regional telecommunica-
tions services.1
cal Access Transport Areas (LATAs), established by the
individual Regional Companies with the approval of the
Court, AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229, each of the LATAs
encompassing "one or more contiguous local exchange ar-
eas serving common social, economic, or other purposes."
Id. Loosely speaking, interexchange service may be
equated with long distance service (although some long
distance service occurs within a LATA and is therefore
not interexchange service within the meaning of the
decree).
Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 540-41 (footnote omitted).
13 The twenty-two Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs")
were integrated into seven Regional Holding Companies (also
known as Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"))
pursuant to the plan of reorganization of AT&T approved by
the court. See United States v. Western Elec., 569 F. Supp.
1057, 1062 n.5 (D.D.C. 1983), affd sub nom. California v.
United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983).
14 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227 (prohibiting BOCs from "di-
rectly or through any affiliated enterprise: (1) provid[ing] inter-
exchange telecommunications services or information services;
(2) manufactur[ing] or provid[ing] telecommunications products
or customer premises equipment ...; or (3) provid[ing] any
other product or service, except exchange telecommunications
and exchange access service, that is not a natural monopoly ser-
vice actually regulated by tariff." Id. at 227-28).
15 Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 532.
18 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
'" Id. The decree defined two-way mobile telephone and
one-way paging services as "exchange services." United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D.D.C. 1983). The
D.C. Circuit held that the decree did not consider the possibility
that the BOCs would want to provide exchange services outside
of their geographic regions. Western Elec., 797 F.2d at 1091.
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A. The Standard of Review Applicable to Modifi-
cations of the Consent Decree
Since the Triennial Review,'" parties have con-
tested the appropriate standard of review applicable
for a modification of the Consent Decree. To deter-
mine the relevant standard, the court must first de-
cide whether the modification is contested.' 9 If one of
the parties to the original Consent Decree opposes
the proposed modification, the court must consider
the modification to be contested.20 If none of the par-
ties to the original Consent Decree contests the mod-
ification, the court will invoke a public interest stan-
dard of whether the resulting array of rights and
liabilities comports with the "public interest."'" This
standard allows the court to approve an uncontested
modification without a showing of changed circum-
stances.22 The court of appeals in its review of the
Triennial Review interpreted this standard to allow
a modification of the MFJ unless there is a certainty
of anticompetitive effect.
23
Compared to an uncontested modification, a modi-
fication contested by one of the parties requires a
much more stringent standard of review. The test
normally applied to a contested modification is
whether there are "'unforeseen conditions' that indi-
cate [ ] a modification [is] appropriate."24 However,
the Consent Decree altered this common law stan-
dard in section VIII(C) by requiring that the restric-
18 See Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 532-36. Until the Tri-
ennial Review, all requests for waivers were decided under sec-
tion VIII(C) of the MFJ. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231 (set-
ting forth MFJ section VIII(C)).
'" Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 532-33.
20 The parties to the consent decree were the DOJ, AT&T
and the RBOCs. In a recent case, the court faced the issue of
whether to define a modification contested if the prime mover
and plaintiff of the original decree, the DOJ, as well as the
RBOCs, supported the modification while AT&T opposed it.
The court held the modification contested. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1992); but
see id. at 1244-47 (Williams, J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719
F.2d 558, 565 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101
(1984); United States v. National Finance Adjusters, Inc., 1985-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 166,856, at 64,248 (E.D. Mich. 1985); see
generally John D. Anderson, Note, Mfodification of Antitrust
Consent Decrees: Over a Double Barrel, 84 MICH. L. REv. 134,
135 (1985)(discussing the standards for modifying a consent
decree).
22 See United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716
(D. Mass. 1975), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
23 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308,
328 (D.D.C. 1991).
24 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 195 n.266 (quoting United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 118 (1932)).
tion would be removed only upon a showing "that
there is no substantial possibility that [the petitioning
BOO] could use its monopoly power to impede com-
petition in the market it seeks to enter."25 A party
requesting a contested Decree modification would
find this altered test much more stringent than the
test for an uncontested modification.
B. The Result of the Triennial Review
In 1987, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia held proceedings pursuant to DOJ's pledge
to report to the court every three years on the contin-
uing need for the lines-of-business restrictions.26
Judge Greene left intact the Decree's restrictions on
manufacturing, interexchange services (including cel-
lular radio, paging and other mobile interexchange
services) and information services.17 He removed,
however, the restriction on the transmission of infor-
mation, but not on the generation of its content.28
The court also removed the restriction embodied in
section II(D)(3) of the Decree on the entry of the
RBOCs into non-telecommunications ventures.29
The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in a de novo review affirmed in part and
reversed in part Judge Greene's holding.30 The ap-
pellate court discussed the section VIII(C) standard
of review,"' holding that to remove a line-of-business
restriction "the BOCs must establish that something
25 Id. at 231.
28 Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D.D.C. 1987).
27 Id. at 601-603.
28 Id. at 603 n.339. Information service is defined in the de-
cree as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information which may be conveyed via telecommuni-
cations." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229.
29 Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 599. Section II(D)(3)
reads, "no BOC shall, directly or through any affiliated enter-
prise: . . . (3) provide any other product or service, except ex-
change telecommunication and exchange access service, that is
not a natural monopoly service actually regulated by tariff."
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28. The Decree did not permit the
BOC's to manufacture telecommunications equipment; however,
they could provide customer premises equipment-"meaning
equipment employed on the premises of a person (other than a
carrier) to originate, route, or terminate telecommunications, but
does not include equipment used to multiplex, maintain, or ter-
minate access lines," Id. at 228 (setting forth MFJ section
IV(E)-and also to produce, publish, and distribute "Yellow
Pages" directories. Id. at 231.
3o United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 284
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. MCI Communications
Corp. v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 283 (1990).
31 See supra notes 24, 25 and accompanying text.
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is different now from the time when the Decree was
entered so that they can no longer use their monop-
oly power to impede competition." 2 Using this stan-
dard, the appellate court did not disturb the lower
court's ruling on either interexchange, manufactur-
ing or non-telecommunications ventures."8 The ap-
pellate court nonetheless reversed and remanded the
lower court's holding on information services.34 The
appellate court noted that the parties to the Decree
did not contest this issue and directed the district
court to use the less stringent "public interest"
standard.
35
On remand, the district court determined that the
RBOCs possessed market power in the information
services industry within the meaning of federal anti-
trust laws." The court found that the RBOCs' mar-
ket power stemmed from their bottleneck control of
"almost complete domination over the 'last mile' of
the telephone network, i.e., their monopoly of the lo-
cal wires and switches without which few, if any,
competitors can reach the ultimate consumers of the
telephone-based information services."' The court
also pointed out that historical, structural, informa-
tional and budgetary considerations made the FCC's
regulation of possible anticompetitive behavior in in-
formation services extremely difficult.3 8
Judge Greene interpreted the appellate remand as
requiring him to "remove the information services
restriction unless there is certainty that entry of the
regional companies . . . will lead to anticompetitive
conduct."'39 Judge Greene reluctantly removed the
" Western Elec., 900 F.2d at 298, 299.
33 Id. at 299.
34 Id. at 308-09.
38 The appellate court observed that the "public interest"
test must take its meaning from the nation's antitrust laws. Id.
(citing United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558,
565 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984)). The
court held that the appropriate question under this standard is
"whether the proposed modification would be certain to lessen
competition in the relevant market." Id. at 308.
11 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308,
315 & n.30 (D.D.C. 1991). The district court answered this
question because the appellate court held that "unless the enter-
ing BOC will have the ability to raise prices or restrict output in
the market it seeks to enter, there can be no substantial possibil-
ity that it could use its monopoly power to 'impede competi-
tion.'" Western Elee., 900 F.2d at 296.
. Western Ele., 767 F. Supp. at 314.
38 Id. at 316-17, 319-20. The court also noted problems in
the new Computer III rules. Part of these rules promote Open
Network Architecture ("ONA") which would:
[U]nbundle the various features available over telephone
lines, in theory providing independent information service
providers with more complete information about network
features and allowing them to pick and choose the specific
restriction on information services, despite the court's
view that the RBOCs would engage in anticompeti-
tive acts.4 Citing its confusion over the interpreta-
tion of the appeals court decision, the district court
stayed the effect of the removal of the information
services restriction pending completion of appellate
review.41 Subsequently, the district court denied mo-
tions to wholly or partially vacate the stay.42
The RBOCs and the DOJ appealed. The court of
appeals lifted the stay, holding that it was an abuse
of discretion because the stay did not pass the tradi-
tional elements necessary for its imposition.4 The
Supreme Court refused to reimpose the stay, al-
lowing the RBOCs to provide information services
during the appellate review.44
C. A Recent Case Related to the Consent Decree
In a case related to the MFJ, the DOJ brought
criminal charges against NYNEX Corporation 45 al-
leging that it did "willfully disobey [the district
court's] lawful and specific Order by providing infor-
mation services."4 The DOJ requested a penalty of
one million dollars. NYNEX purportedly violated
the court's order through its Telco Research arm. It
allegedly provided these information services in 1986
and 1987 when the information services prohibition
still applied as part of the MFJ. The District Court
for the District of Columbia denied several of
NYNEX's motions for dismissal. The trial occurred
between April 6 and April 9, 1992. On February 16,
features they need. The proposed Computer III rules also
call for new regulations on cost accounting designed to
render it more difficult for Regional Companies to subsi-
dize their information services with revenue from their lo-
cal exchange monopoly.
Id. at 319; see also In re Separation of Costs of Regulates Tele-
phone Service from Costs of Nonregulated Activities, Report and
Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 1298 (1987); In re Amendment to Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd. 1150
(1988) [hereinafter Computer III Inquiry].
38 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 328.
, See id. at 315.
41 Western Elec, 767 F. Supp. at 332-33.
42 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 774 F. Supp. 13,
15 (D.D.C. 1991).
41 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) P69,610 (D.C. Cir. 1991), stay denied sub nom. Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
366 (1991).
4' American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 366, 366 (1991).
45 See United States v. NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp. 16, 17
(D.D.C. 1992).
46 Id. (quoting Indictment P8).
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1993, Judge Greene found NYNEX guilty of violat-
ing the MFJ restriction on information services, and
fined NYNEX one million dollars.17 NYNEX is ap-
pealing the decision.
D. Common Channel Signaling
In recent years, new signaling technology termed
"out-of-band" or "common channel signaling"
("CCS")" has been developed that would allow the
BOCs to deploy centralized signal transfer points
("STPs"). Each STP has the capacity to serve sev-
eral of a BOC's Local Access Transport Areas
("LATAs").4 9 In utilizing this technology, the
RBOCs would prefer to set up centralized switches
and have the interexchange carriers connect at the
central point, thereby installing less STPs.
In a 1990 decision, Judge Greene denied a request
for a waiver of the Decree restriction that would
have permitted the RBOCs to provide common
channel signaling interconnection.5" The Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the deci-
sion as well as the district court's use of the more
stringent section VIII(C) test because AT&T op-
posed the modification.51
II. INTELSAT, COMSAT, AND
PANAMSAT CONTROVERSY
THE
In 1989, Alpha Lyracom Space Communications,
4 Criminal case #90-238(HHG).
48 Conceptually, "out of band" technology separates the in-
formation responsible for transferring and connecting a tele-
phone call from the actual voice or data being carried over the
line. This allows new services such as "Caller ID" to be imple-
mented. "Common channel signaling" is an advance computer
program that continuously monitors and inventories circuits in
order to allow virtually immediate connection in interexchange
telecommunications. Telephone Interview with David Irwin,
Partner, Irwin, Campbell & Crowe (April 4, 1993).
' A LATA is a local exchange area encompassing "one or
more contiguous local exchange areas serving common social, ec-
onomic, or other purposes." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 229; see
also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1234-35
(D.C. Cir. 1992); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
11 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 131 F.R.D. 647, 652
(D.D.C. 1990). The decree requires the RBOCs to deliver ex-
change access traffic (local customers) to the interexchange carri-
ers (long distance providers) at points of presence in every
LATA (from the local area). See Western Elec., 569 F. Supp. at
994 & n.13. The RBOCs argued that new technology (common
channel signaling and Signaling System 7 (SS7-CCS)) would al-
low them to provide network control in just a few central points
at cheaper rates. Western Elec., 131 F.R.D. at 650. However,
the Court held that this would bring the RBOCs into the inter-
exchange telecommunications prohibited by the decree. Id. at
Inc. d/b/a Pan American Satellite ("PanAmSat")
filed a $1.5 billion antitrust suit against the Commu-
nications Satellite Corporation ("Comsat") under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.52
PanAmSat sought injunctive relief and treble dam-
ages pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act.53 The district court granted Comsat's
motion to dismiss, 54 and the appellate court affirmed
the dismissal but reversed and remanded to entitle
PanAmSat to amend its complaint.
55
A. A Brief History of Comsat and INTELSAT
Congress enacted the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962 ("CSA" or "Act") 56 to implement "in
conjunction and in cooperation with other countries,
as expeditiously as practicable, a commercial com-
munications satellite system." 5 The Act made Com-
sat-a publicly held, private United States corpora-
tion-responsible for planning, constructing and
operating the satellite system, including satellite ter-
minal stations, and for leasing space satellite tele-
communications channels to communications com-
mon carriers. 58 A section of the Act known as the
antitrust consistency clause states: "[T]he activities of
[Comsat] ... and of the persons or companies partic-
ipating in the ownership of the corporation shall be
consistent with the federal antitrust laws."'59
In 1964, eleven nations entered into an interim
executive agreement creating INTELSAT.61 Subse-
650-51.
51 Western Elec., 969 F.2d at 1241 ("[A]lthough it is true
that [the appellate court] cannot be said to have held that
AT&T's opposition makes a requested modification contested-
because the point was not directly controverted."). See id. supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
5" Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169,188
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
55 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 169 (2d Cir. 1991).
56 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
57 Id.
51 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 731, 734(a), 735(a)(1)-(3).
59 47 U.S.C. § 701(c). "Congress sought to ensure that: all
authorized users shall have nondiscriminatory access to the sys-
tem; that maximum competition be maintained in the provision
of equipment and services utilized by the system . . . ." Alpha
Lyracom, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 64,579 (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 721(A)(4)).
o See Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a
Global Communications Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15




quently, these signatories executed two additional
agreements delineating the control and management
structure for the international satellite network and
its related facilities." These agreements forced an
applicant for a separate satellite system providing in-
ternational satellite service to engage in "consulta-
tions" with INTELSAT to ensure technical compat-
ibility with the system and to protect INTELSAT
from competition resulting in significant economic
harm to INTELSAT.62 In 1976, the United States
entered into an agreement with INTELSAT that in-
cluded a provision making "officers and employees of
INTELSAT, the representatives of the Parties and
of the Signatories... [ ] immune from suit and legal
process relating to acts performed by them in their
official capacity and falling within their functions.
"363
In 1984, after several satellite service providers
filed applications with the FCC to develop separate
international telecommunications satellite systems,64
the Reagan Administration responded with a Presi-
dential Determination concluding that "separate in-
ternational communications satellite systems were re-
quired in the national interest."65 In accordance with
this determination, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Commerce jointly prescribed that sepa-
rate satellite systems should be restricted to the sale
or long-term lease of transponders with communica-
61 See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization, Feb. 12, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3813
[hereinafter Definitive Agreement] (establishing an organiza-
tional structure for Intelsat); see also Operating Agreement Re-
lating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organi-
zation Intelsat, Feb. 12, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 10 I.L.M. 1909
[hereinafter Operating Agreement]; International Telecommuni-
cations Convention, Apr 7, 1976, 14 I.L.M. 706 [hereinafter
Headquarters Agreement]. These agreements gave the
Organization:
[a]uthority to set rates for use of Intelsat satellite capacity,
Definitive Agreement arts. V(d), VIII(b)(v)(C),
X(a)(viii); Operating Agreement art. 8(a); to approve In-
telsat's purchase of goods and services, Definitive Agree-
ment arts. X(a)(ii), XIII; Operating Agreement art. 16;
and to approve proposals to establish international and
domestic telecommunications satellite system separate
from Intelsat.
Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 169-170 (2d Cir. 1991).
62 See Definitive Agreement, supra note 61, arts. XIV(c)-
(d).
6" Alpha Lyracom, 946 F. 2d at 171 (quoting Headquarters
Agreement P.16).
"" Orion Satellite Corporation was the first on March 11,
1983, followed by International Satellite, Inc., RCA American
Communications, Inc., Cygnus Satellite Corporation, Pan Amer-
ican Satellite Corporation and Financial Satellite Corporation.
tions not interconnected with public-switched net-
works ("PSNs"), and that the alternative systems
must receive authorization from affected INTEL-
SAT signatories. 6 Congress encoded these prescrip-
tions into law in 1985,6" and the FCC conditioned
the issuance of alternate licenses on the applicant's
successful consultations with INTELSAT signato-
ries in compliance with Article XIV(d) of the Defin-
itive Agreement.
6 8
PanAmSat first applied to the FCC in 1984 to
provide international service between North, Cen-
tral, and South America, the Iberian peninsula and
the Caribbean. 69 PanAmSat launched its first satel-
lite (PAS-1) in June 1988, and has since received
conditional approval from the FCC to build, launch
and operate three more satellites (PAS-2, PAS-4,
and PAS-7).70
PanAmSat's complaint against Comsat alleged
that Comsat acted in an anticompetitive manner "by
passing a resolution to boycott competing systems,
delaying Article XIV(c) and Article XIV(d) consul-
tations, pricing satellite telecommunications service
without regard to cost, and purchasing excess satel-lite capacity."" PanAmSat also alleged that Comsat
filed a sham opposition to the application for tax
deferral submitted by Rene Anselmo, sole-proprietor
of Alpha Lyracom, relating to the development,
purchase and launch of PAS-1; made false represen-
See Sigrid Arlene Mendel, Note, Authorization of Private Inter-
national Satellite Systems in Competition with Comsat: An
Analysis of the Underlying Legal Justifications and Policy Fac-
tors, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 279, 292-96 (1986).
65 Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg.
46,987 (1984).
" See Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 170 (analyzing letter
from Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Com-
merce Malcolm Baldridge to Chairman Mark S. Fowler of the
Federal Communications Commission (Nov. 28, 1984)).
67 See The Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA),
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, section 146, 99
Stat. 405, 425-26 (1985). "The FRAA also make [sic] compli-
ance with the requirements set forth in Presidential Determina-
tion No. 85-2 and the requirement that one or more foreign au-
thorities have authorized the use of such system consistent with
such conditions a precondition of consultation with Intelsat." Al-
pha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 172.
" See In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing In-
ternational Communications, 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046, para. 267
(1985); see also supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
6 See In re Alpha Lyracom Application for Authority to
Construct, Launch and Operate a Hybrid International Com-
munications Satellite System, Memorandum Opinion, Order and
Authorization, 6 FCC Rcd. 5132, paras. 2-4 (1991).
70 See In re Alpha Lyracom, Memorandum Opinion, Order
and Authorization, 7 FCC Rcd. 4277, para. 2 (1992).
" See Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 172-73.
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tations of PanAmSat's inability to complete Article
XIV(c) and Article XIV(d) consultations to potential
customers; and refused to do business with
PanAmSat 7
B. District Court Dismissal
Comsat moved for dismissal of PanAmSat's com-
plaint in district court for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to join
a necessary and indispensable party.7 3 District court
Judge John F. Keenan dismissed the complaint. 4 In
considering the motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim where relief may be granted, the court "bore
in mind that the antitrust laws must be construed
liberally and that antitrust immunity is disfa-
vored."7 5 PanAmSat attempted to circumvent the im-
munity provisions under the INTELSAT agree-
ments by arguing that Comsat is a signatory and a
party and not a representative of INTELSAT. 6
Judge Keenan rejected this argument because
PanAmSat acknowledged in its complaint that Com-
sat is the United States representative to INTEL-
SAT, and because Article XV(c) of the Definitive
Agreement confers "appropriate privileges and im-
munities to INTELSAT . . . to Parties . . .[and] to
Signatories [e.g., Comsat] and representatives of
Signatories.""
PanAmSat also argued that Congress had waived
Comsat's grant of immunity in the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 by saying that the activities of
Comsat shall be consistent with the antitrust laws."
Judge Keenan reviewed the legislative history of the
Act and determined that "Congress did not intend to
subject Comsat to the antitrust laws with respect to
72 Id. at 173.
See Alpha Lyracom, 1990-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) P69188,
64,579 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1990).
74 Id.
11 Id. at 64,582 (citing National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue
Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981); Group Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231
(1979)).
" See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
17 Alpha Lyracom, 1990-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) at 64,583
(quoting Headquarters Agreement P16).
78 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
7 See Alpha Lyracom, 1990-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) at
64,583. Judge Keenan concluded that Comsat should not be ex-
posed to antitrust liability when participating in Article XIV
consultations as representative of the United States government,
voting on resolutions at Intelsat meetings, or when participating
in Intelsat pricing or procurement decisions. Id.
8 See id. at 64,583-88. Because communications common
carriers would be permitted to participate in the ownership of
its activities as Signatory to INTELSAT." 9 Judge
Keenan did, however, rule that Congress had in-
tended the antitrust laws to apply to Comsat in its
capacity as a common carrier.8 0
While dismissing the above motion, the court went
on to discuss alternative motions for dismissal. On
the failure to join necessary and indispensable par-
ties, the court decided that INTELSAT and its
member-nations are necessary and indispensible par-
ties under Federal Rule 19(a) and (b).8 l On the fail-
ure to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
the court maintained that injunctive relief could not
be granted because an injunction would have to be
directed at both Comsat as well as the individual na-
tions which have responsibility for the alleged un-
lawful activities.8 2
C. Appellate Review of the District Court
Dismissal
The primary issue that the appellate court faced
was whether Comsat "is immune from antitrust lia-
bility for activity undertaken in its role as the United
States representative [to INTELSAT]. '8 3 The ap-
pellate court followed the district court's holding that
the antitrust consistency clause in the Communica-
tions Satellite Act 4 applies only to Comsat as a com-
mon carrier, and not to actions of Comsat as signa-
tory to INTELSAT. 5 In deciphering the immunity
provisions of the Definitive Agreement and the
Headquarters Agreement,"6 the court held that these
provisions and congressional intent in the CSA could
only be read to grant Comsat immunity in its official
function as signatory. 7
The appellate court, however, disagreed with
Comsat, "Congress displayed concern that the newly-created
corporation would be dominated by common carriers such as
AT&T, and that such ownership would permit them to collude
or subvert Comsat for private gain." Id.
"I "The lion's share of the complaint's allegations depict
concerted action between Comsat and Intelsat's member-nations
to restrain trade and monopolize the international telecommuni-
cations market." Id. at 64,585.
82 Id.
83 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 169 (2d Cir. 1991).
84 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
81 Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 174.
88 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
87 Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 174. "Congress could not
have intended to require Comsat to participate in Intelsat subject
to Executive Branch directives and, at the same time, have in-
tended that Comsat proceed at its own antitrust peril in carrying
out that official role." Id.
[Vol. I
ANTITRUST ACTIONS
Judge Keenan that PanAmSat's complaint only al-
leged activities by Comsat in its capacity as signatory
and not in its capacity as a common carrier."8 The
appellate court found in PanAmSat's complaint "al-
legations of anticompetitive conduct by COMSAT in
its 'separate role' as the sole provider of access to the
global satellite system to United States communica-
tions carriers." 9 The appellate court reversed and
remanded to allow PanAmSat to recast its complaint.
However, the court cautioned PanAmSat to clearly
isolate actionable conduct by Comsat as common car-
rier.9" The court held that it did not have to rule on
Comsat's motion to dismiss on grounds of not joining
indispensable parties because the revised complaint
would not include Comsat as signatory to INTEL-
SAT. The court did allow PanAmSat to replead its
state law claims while reminding PanAmSat of New
York's strict pleading requirements. 1
PanAmSat has revised and refiled an amended
complaint alleging that Comsat monopolized or con-
spired to monopolize the international satellite mar-
ket. 2 In this repleading, PanAmSat has focused on
Comsat's behavior as a common carrier. The case is
in the motions and discovery process. Thus far, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled that PanAmSat has standing to challenge
Comsat's alleged monopolistic acts and has denied
Comsat's motion to dismiss.9" PanAmSat also peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
concerning the appellate court decision. The Su-
preme Court denied PanAmSat's petition in 1992.11
D. Independent Satellite System Interconnected
with the PSN
On November 28, 1984, the Reagan Administra-
tion determined that the national interest required
the creation of independent United States satellite
systems in the international telecommunications
field.95 Following an intergovernmental task force
review, the FCC allowed separate satellite systems,
88 Id. at 175.
" Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 38).
90 Id.
91 Id.
82 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., No. 88 Civ. 5021 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov.
13, 1991).
" 4 Year-Old-Case; Court Denies Comsat Motion to Dis-
miss Panamsat Antitrust Suit, COMM. DAILY, 6 (April 2, 1993).
" Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1174, 1174 (1992).
, See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See generally Guy Krogh, The Satellite Competition De-
which are restricted to the sale or long-term lease of
space segment capacity for communications not in-
terconnected with PSNs. 8 The government insti-
tuted these restrictions to protect INTELSAT from
economic harm in accordance with INTELSAT's
original treaties and negotiations.
In 1991, PanAmSat asked the FCC to allow inde-
pendent satellite systems to interconnect with the
PSN. The FCC deferred action on PanAmSat's re-
quest pending a recommendation from an intergov-
ernmental task force.9 On November 27, 1991, the
State Department and the NTIA endorsed com-
pletely the proposal of eliminating restrictions on in-
terconnection of separate systems by 1997. The FCC
ruled in March 1992 that separate satellite systems
can interconnect with the PSN as of January 1997.8
The delay in altering the regulations would allow
INTELSAT a chance to adjust to new competition.
Even before the FCC lifts the PSN restriction in
1997, the FCC, under the interagency position
adopted by the Bush Administration, will allow sep-
arate satellite systems to interconnect with the pub-
lic-switched network on a long-term contract basis as
long as the systems limit their services to private line
services. 99
III. MOBILE SATELLITE SERVICE AND
DIGITAL AUDIO BROADCASTING
Mobile Satellite Service ("MSS") is one of the
fastest growing areas of consumer-oriented commu-
nications services. MSS includes any communica-
tions (i.e., voice or data, one-way, two-way or mul-
tidirectional) that involve a mobile or non-stationary
receiver or transmitter.
A. History of the American Mobile Satellite
Consortium
In 1986 and 1987, the FCC reallocated a portion
bate: An Analysis of FCC Policy and an Argument in Support
of Open Competition, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 867 (1989).
"' The Year Ahead, Congress, the FCC and Judge Greene's
Court, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND REGULATION
1991, at 5 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 328, 1991).
"8 FCC Says Separate Satellite Systems Can Interconnect
with PSN, COMM. DAILY, March 13, 1992, at 5.
99 See In re Permissible Services of U.S. Licensed Interna-
tional Communications Satellite Systems Separate from the In-
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Order, 7
FCC Rcd. 2313, para. 5 (1992).
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of the upper L-band spectrum for MSS which previ-
ously had been allocated to Aeronautical Mobile Sat-
ellite Service ("AMSS"). In reallocating this portion
of the frequency, the FCC intended to provide the
nascent MSS industry with maximum flexibility.
Recognizing the extraordinary costs in launching a
new satellite system, the FCC decided that the MSS
license would be granted to a consortium of finan-
cially qualified applicant corporations.' The FCC
defined "qualified" as the ability to make a five mil-
lion dollar cash contribution which would be used
for expenses associated with the start-up costs of the
MSS system.' Eight applicants satisfied the eligi-
bility requirements and formed the consortium now
called the American Mobile Satellite Corporation
("AMSC").
Three corporations which were denied eligibility
by the FCC, as well as Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
("ARINC"), an applicant for a license to provide
AMSS services, appealed the FCC's decision.' 2 The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the FCC's decision to deny the three
corporation's applications, "finding no reasoned jus-
tifications for the agency's decisions requiring appli-
cants to demonstrate financial ability through a $5
million cash deposit .... "103 The court also reversed
the FCC's imposition of consortium-licensing in lieu
of comparative hearings.!0
In its final decision, the FCC concluded that the
consortium licensing approach "would best serve the
interest in this instance,"'0 5 due to the unique as-
10 See In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commis-
sion's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Re-
port and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 1825 (1986), recon. denied, 2 FCC
Rcd. 6830 (1987), further recon. denied, 4 FCC Rcd. 6029
(1989).
101 See In re Amendment of Parts 2, 22, and 25 of the Com-
mission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum for Use in a Land Mobile
Satellite Service, Final Decision on Remand, 7 FCC Rcd. 266,
267 para. 2 (1992) [hereinafter LMSS Remand].
102 See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428, 432-
33 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 LMSS Remand, supra note 101, at 267 para. 8 (inter-
preting United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192
(1956)). While section 30 9(e) of the Communications Act of
1934 provides that the FCC may not deny an application with-
out affording an opportunity for hearing, the right to a compara-
tive hearing may not be absolute. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 339 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
106 LMSS Remand, supra note 101, at 267 para. 8.
107 Id. at 270 para. 26. "The Commission emphasized that
the international negotiations were at a critical juncture, and ex-
plained that the delay caused by conducting time-consuming
pects of satellite licensing.' 6 In this case, the FCC
imposed a mandatory consortium because "active
and immediate participation by an authorized licen-
see is imperative for the United States to secure nec-
essary spectrum through the international frequency
coordination process."' 0 7 The FCC allowed the three
appellants to participate in the consortium without
the mandatory financial contribution.' Finally, the
FCC affirmed AMSC as the authorized licensee to
construct, launch and operate an MSS system.' 0 9
B. The AMSC/Radio Satellite Controversy
California-based Radio Satellite Corporation
("RSC") hopes to offer Radiosat service beginning
in 1994.0 RSC defines its Radiosat service to in-
clude digital audio broadcasting ("DAB"), position-
ing and interactive data service for automobiles and
ships."' RSC would need to utilize geostationary
("GEO") or low-earth-orbiting ("LEO") satellites
to implement its service. RSC planned to buy capac-
ity on the AMSC satellite in order to deliver MSS
communications services to end-users. 12
In early 1992, RSC filed an action against AMSC
for three hundred million dollars in trebled damages
for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
Communications Act of 1934. 1 RSC claimed that
AMSC abused its marketplace position while negoti-
ating circuit pricing on its satellite to be launched in
1984."' In its complaint, RSC alleged violations of
the Communications Act-sections 201(a), 201(b),
comparative hearings would severely weaken the U.S. negotiat-
ing position and disserve the public interest." Id. (discussing
Tenative Decision, 6 FCC Rcd. 4906-11, paras. 33-53 (1991)).
108 LMSS Remand, supra note 101, at para. 62.
109 Id. para. 61.
110 Radio Satellite Corp. Moving Ahead Despite AMSC's
Troubles, SATELLITE NEWS, October 7, 1991, at 5.
"' Digital audio broadcasting would deliver at least ten na-
tional CD-quality audio programs, positioning would offer con-
sumers information about traffic events in real time or effectively
get emergency help, and interactive data service may allow a
consumer to purchase a product advertised over the radio by
pressing a button. Id.
112 See Amended Complaint at 50-56, Radio Satellite Corp.
v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-
0405). RSC wanted to buy or lease capacity on the AMSC satel-
lite to broadcast to units it would sell directly to the public.
These units would provide the end-user-the mobile cus-
tomer-with the services that RSC provided. Id.
11 Radio Satellite Corp. Sues AMSC for $ 200 Million in
D.C. Court, SATELLITE NEWS, February 17, 1992, at 1.
114 Id. The satellite provider leases or sells space segment
capacity on its satellite. Basically, the satellite is divided into cir-
cuits that can each be leased or sold to individual customers.
RSC alleges AMSC refused to offer a fair price differential for
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and 202(a)-for violating its duty as a common car-
rier engaged in interstate communications by radio
to furnish such communication service upon reasona-
ble request; for imposing unjust and unreasonable
charges upon RSC; and for discriminating among
customers as a common carrier." 5 Additionally,
RSC alleged five antitrust counts for violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act Section 1 and 2 against
AMSC and co-conspirators McCaw Cellular Com-
munications Company, Inc., Hughes Communica-
tions, Inc. and Mtel, Inc."' RSC alleged that
AMSC's conduct, arrangements and agreements con-
stituted an unlawful contract, combination and/or
conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in the
MSS resale market; AMSC's action constituted an
attempt to monopolize the MSS resale market by
significantly reducing or eliminating effective compe-
tition; AMSC abused its monopoly power granted by
virtue of its exclusive FCC license for primary MSS
to gain competitive advantage in the MSS resale
market by refusing to provide reasonable access to
MSS resale competitors such as RSC; and AMSC
has denied reasonable access to an essential facility
that it controls by virtue of its FCC exclusive license
to provide MSS." 7
RSC filed for bankruptcy in the beginning of
1992, and alleged in its complaint that AMSC was
directly responsible for the bankruptcy. Included in
its list of injuries allegedly resulting from AMSC's
conduct were the "complete loss of equity that RSC
has raised and [an] inability to repay debt incurred
in the course of conduct of its business; by inability
to attract investors due to AMSC's denial of access;.
and other damages."" 8
the large number of circuits that it needed to offer its "Radiosat"
service. Id.
115 See Amended Complaint at 50-56, Radio Satellite Corp.
v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., (D.D.C. 1992) (No. 92-
0405).
"6 Id. at 63.
See generally id. at 56-66.
118 Id. at 60.
... Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
.2 Id. at 373-74 & n.4. Subscribers to cable receive pro-
gramming in exchange for the payment of subscription fees to
cable system operators who function as local distributors in the
areas they serve. Id.
"I Id. at 373-74 & n.1 (alleging violations of section 1 and 2
of the Sherman Antitrust Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act).
12 Id. at 373. "Plaintiffs' claim . . . alleges monopolization
of certain local markets for cable television in the United States.
. and an abuse and misuse of monopoly power in those markets
IV. VIA COM INTERNATIONAL
TIME WARNER INC.
INC. v.
In 1989, Viacom International Inc. ("Viacom")
and Showtime Networks Inc. ("Showtime") brought
an antitrust action against Time Warner Inc.
("Time"), Home Box Office, Inc. ("HBO"), Ameri-
can Television & Communications Corporation
("ATC") and Manhattan Cable Television, Inc.
("MCTV")." 9 Viacom operates Showtime and The
Movie Channel ("TMC"), two pay television pro-
gramming services. 20 HBO and Cinemax, also pay
television services, and ATC, the owner of MCTV,
are all wholly-owned subsidiaries of Time.
Viacom's complaint alleged that Time, through its
HBO and ATC subsidiaries, violated the federal an-
titrust laws through monopolistic and anticompeti-
tive behavior. 2 ' Generally, Viacom alleged that
Time's cable television subsidiaries were monopoliz-
ing the pay television business.' 2 2 The District Court
for the Southern District of New York responded to
Time's motions for dismissal, partial summary judg-
ment and/or partial judgment on the pleadings. 2
Plaintiffs Viacom and Showtime claimed that de-
fendants Time and HBO used their monopoly lever-
aging power through ATC and MCTV to exclude
Showtime and TMC in the local markets. 4 Plain-
tiffs further claimed that this exclusionary activity
also had an effect on the national market by denying
Plaintiffs economies of scale.'2 5
After a detailed analysis, the court refused the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss. Judge McKenna did
dismiss the Plaintiffs' Sherman Act section 1 claim
that the Defendants, through contract, combination
and/or conspiracy, unreasonably restrained trade.' 26
This holding, however, did not affect the Plaintiffs'
to gain a competitive advantage and restrain trade unreasonably
in the market for pay television programming services in the




According to Plaintiffs, the leveraging claim stands ... on
the percentage of the programming services market over
which defendant Time, Inc., through its subsidiary, HBO,
Inc., allegedly exerts control, and on the interplay be-
tween that power in the national market and the allegedly
exclusionary activities of ATC and MCTV in the local
markets.
Id. at 377. See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980)(discussing violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act
where a firm uses monopoly power in one market to gain a com-
petitive advantage in another).
128 Viacom Int'l, 785 F. Supp. at 384-85.
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state law antitrust claim.
In August, 1992, the two parties reached an out-
of-court settlement ending the antitrust action.'2
Under the settlement, neither party admitted to any
liability in resolving the suit. The settlement in-
cluded the following provisions: (1) Time will pay
Viacom $75 million and will buy Viacom's Milwau-
kee cable system for $95 million; (2) Time will give
Showtime and TMC wider distribution on Time's
cable systems; (3) Time will extend affiliation agree-
ments between the MTV Network and Time's cable
systems; and (4) Time will increase advertising
purchases on the MTV Network.12 8 In addition,
HBO and Viacom cable systems have amended their
affiliation agreements.
V. TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
TEMPO, AND DIRECT BROADCAST
SATELLITE
Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI"), the largest
multiple system operator in the United States, con-
trols cable systems serving sixteen percent of the na-
tion's 53.9 million subscribers. 2 ' Tempo Enter-
prises, Inc. (Tempo) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
TCI. Direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") is a one-
way satellite down-link that can transmit television
signals. Because of the technology surrounding a sat-
ellite's footprint, DBS can be received in rural areas
not already connected to standard cable.
A. Competition Between Direct Broadcast Satellite
and Cable Television
The FCC has long anticipated that DBS service
will provide an effective competitive alternative to
127 See Wayne Walley, Time Warner, Viacom Settle, ELEC-
TRONIC MEDIA, August 24, 1992, at 2.
128 Id.
129 In Re Application of Tempo Satellite, Inc., Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2728, 2731 n.20, (1992)
[hereinafter In Re Tempo] (quoting Cable and Station Coverage
Atlas at 4-5 (Warren Publishing, Inc. 1992), BROADCASTING,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 53).
"20 See In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Com-
mission's Policies Relating to Cable Television Systems, Report,
5 FCC Rcd. 4962, 5017-18 (1990).
131 Id.
12 See In re Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in
Broadcast Licensing, Report, Order and Policy Statement, 102
F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986), on reconsideration, 1 FCC Rcd 421
(1986), appeal dismissed sub nom. National Ass'n for Better
Broadcasting v. FCC, no. 86-1179 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 1987).
1' In Re Tempo, 7 FCC Rcd. at para. 11.
cable television.'3 0 The FCC has stressed the appli-
cability of traditional antitrust principles to promote
the emergence of alternative, effectively competitive,
multi-channel distributors.'' Along with principles
of competition, the FCC conditions a DBS permit on
the applicants meeting requisite character
qualifications.' 32
In 1988, Tempo applied to the FCC to construct a
DBS system. Tempo intends to provide DBS service
to homes that have no access to cable television and
to those households that have access but decline to
subscribe.'3 3 Tempo also proposes to offer DBS to
homes with existing cable that want ancillary
services.' 34
B. The FCC's Response to the Tempo Application
The FCC deferred its decision on Tempo's DBS
application pending the resolution of a complaint
filed by the National Association for Better Broad-
casting and the Telecommunications Research and
Action Center ("NABB/TRAC"). 3 5 The NABB/
TRAC complaint raised concerns related to a Mis-
souri case "in which a jury rendered a $35.6 million
verdict against TCI on alternative damage awards
for violation of federal antitrust law and tortious in-
terference with business under Missouri law."' 36
In its 1992 review of Tempo's pending DBS ap-
plication, the FCC concluded that the NABB/
TRAC complaint raised prima facie questions re-
garding TCI's character qualifications, but that the
antitrust adjudication raised "no substantial and ma-
terial questions of fact regarding TEMPO's basic
qualifications."' 37 The FCC did express concern
over National Rural Telecommunications Coopera-
tive's ("NRTC") complaint alleging unlawful dis-
134 Id.
1I See In re Application of Continental Satellite Corpora-
tion, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6292,
6299 (1989).
136 FCC grants interim DBS License to TCI's Tempo Satel-
lite Inc., SATELLITE NEWS, May 11, 1992, at 3. See Central
Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 610 F. Supp. 891,
894-95 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (where an employee of TCI
threatened to destroy a city consultant's career, and also to satu-
rate the market with home satellite dishes if the city did not re-
new TCI's franchise), aft'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987).
1.7 In Re Tempo, 7 FCC Rcd. at para. 7. The FCC looked
at the misconduct in terms of willfulness, frequency, time
elapsed, seriousness, nature of the participation, efforts to rem-
edy, and the applicant's record of compliance with the FCC's
rules and policies. Id. para. 3.
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crimination by two home dish satellite carriers that
were owned in whole or part by TCI.'38 The FCC
also expressed concern over the prior affiliation of
two TCI principals with Capcom Financial Services,
Inc. during the period for which Capcom was in-
dicted on money laundering charges along with the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International
("BCCI").139
Despite these concerns, the FCC granted Tempo's
DBS application. The FCC's grant allowed Tempo
to deliver eleven channels to each half of the United
States with the following conditions: (1) Tempo may
not provide ancillary service in areas with TCI-affil-
iated cable systems; (2) Tempo must offer its service
on a non-discriminatory basis; and (3) the grant is
conditioned on the outcome of formal complaint pro-
ceedings, criminal or civil, regarding TCI, its princi-
pals or related entities.'40
Barely two months after the FCC released this re-
view, Data Broadcasting, Inc. brought a $26.5 mil-
lion suit against TCI for monopolistic tactics in in-
terfering with the sale of The Learning Channel
("TLC").14' The suit, filed in federal court in New
York, alleged that TCI told a buyer interested in
TLC that TCI would drop TLC from its cable sys-
tems. When that buyer pulled out, TCI's affiliate,
the Discovery Channel, bought TLC for a twenty
million dollar discount.' 42 Data Broadcasting's action
is pending.
VI. THE IMPACT OF 1992's ANTITRUST
ACTIONS
A. The Bell Consent Decree
The full impact of the latest cases connected to the
Bell Consent Decree will not be known for some
time, in part because the DOJ has reversed course
1.8 Id. para. 13. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc. and Netlink
USA were alleged to have violated section 202 of the Communi-
cations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 208. Id.
139 Id. n.33.
140 Id. para. 19.
141 Rich Brown & Randall M. Sukow, TCI Sued for $26.5
Million over Learning Channel Sale, BROADCASTING, July 6,
1992, at 5.
142 See id.
143 See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
145 See United States v. Western Elec., 767 F. Supp. 308,
317 (D.D.C. 1991).
148 Id. at 314-17. In this case, Judge Greene found that the
RBOC's market power came from their bottleneck control of
"indispensable and ubiquitous local wires and switches" for
which there were no close substitutes. Id. These essential facili-
during the last ten years. When it first brought the
antitrust action that led to the Consent Decree, the
DOJ firmly opposed the RBOC's entrance into
manufacturing, information services and inter-
exchange services.1 43 During and after the Triennial
Review, the DOJ actively advocated the lifting of
some of these restrictions. Because the DOJ has not
contested lifting the restrictions, the district court
must use a less stringent "public interest" standard
of review in deciding most of the cases. 144 Currently,
only two of the lines-of-business restrictions re-
straining the RBOCs still apply-manufacturing
and interexchange-and presumably the RBOCs
will continue to battle against these restrictions.
1. Judge Greene's Warnings
On remand from the appellate court's review of
the 1987 Triennial Review, Judge Greene warned
that FCC regulatory and DOJ enforcement actions
would not constrain the RBOC's anticompetitive ac-
tivities.145 As a prerequisite to antitrust evaluations,
Judge Greene found that the RBOC's "possess mar-
ket power in the information services market.'
' 41
The court asserted that the RBOCs could use their
market power to discriminate against competitors
and subsidize competitive enterprises with income
derived from regulated monopolies. 4 The RBOCs
responded that the information services market is na-
tional in scope and that the local BOCs do not have
power in the national market.' 48
Judge Greene contended that the FCC does not
possess the regulatory power to constrain the
RBOCs' anticompetitive conduct.'49 The court ar-
gued that FCC regulation will be impaired due to
the complex structure resulting from the diversifica-
tion of the RBOCs, as well as the certainty that ad-
ties, which could not feasibly be duplicated, gave the RBOCs the
ability to raise prices or restrict output. Id.
147 Id. at 324.
148 Id. at 312-13. Judge Greene intimated that Bellcore, the
joint research and development arm of the RBOCs, could facili-
tate collusion and market power. Bell Communications Research
("Bellcore") served to develop and coordinate technical standards
and perform testing of equipment and facilities for the BOCs.
Id. at 313 n.16.
... Id. at 320. The court looked to AT&T's past ability to
switch from one anticompetitive activity to another to evade reg-
ulators, and AT&T's endless dilatory maneuvers to evade anti-
trust enforcement actions as evidence of the RBOC's ability to
do the same thing. The Court also pointed to the structural,
budgetary and financial deficiencies within the FCC that might
limit regulatory strength. Id. at 320-21 & n.58.
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vancing technology will overwhelm regulatory ef-
forts.150  Additionally, the court argued that the
FCC's new Computer III and Open Network Archi-
tecture ("ONA")' 5' rules had suffered a defeat in a
Ninth Circuit Court decision, 5 2 and that even if re-
instated, these rules have no track record of overcom-
ing the regulatory difficulties raised above.
2. The FCC and DOJ Response to Judge
Greene's Concerns
Since the Ninth Circuit vacated the FCC's Com-
puter III and ONA rules, the FCC has reviewed
and reinstated their most important regulatory as-
pects."' The Computer III rules lift the structural
safeguards and impose non-structural safeguards on
150 Id. at 320. Judge Greene, in this instance, impugned reg-
ulatory enforcement in stating "[riegulatory enforcement pro-
ceedings often take years to complete and that, even then, the
decisions that emerge are by and large only prospective in appli-
cation." Id.
"' See infra note 154.
152 Western Elec., 767 F. Supp. at 319. See California v.
FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1246 (9th Cir. 1990). The Computer III
decisions before the Ninth Circuit were the Phase I Order, the
Phase I Reconsideration Order, and the Phase II Order. In re
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, in CC Docket No. 85-229; Phase I Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958, para 16 (1986); Phase I Reconsideration Order, 2
FCC Rcd. 3035, paras. 1-2 (1987); Phase II Order 2 FCC Rcd.
3072, paras. 7-10 (1987).
153 See In re Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Oper-
ating Company Safeguards; and Tier 1 Local Exchange Com-
pany Safeguards, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Order, 6
FCC Rcd. 174, para. 2-3 (1990) [hereinafter In re Computer
III).
151 "Basic services" are defined as the provision of a "trans-
mission pipeline" to "move voice, data, or video communications
from one point to another." Corporate persons who offer these
services are deemed "common carriers." "Enhanced services"
provide something more than a communications pipeline and
utilize computer processing to alter the format, content, code or
protocol of a subscribers transmitted information; provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or
involve subscriber interaction with stored information. Enhanced
services providers are not considered common carriers. Richard
E. Wiley, The Media and the Communications Revolution: An
Overview of the Regulatory Framework and Developing
Trends,in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1991, at 82-83 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks. and Literary Property Course Hand-
book Series No. 325, 1991).
Structural safeguards required in Computer II regulations al-
low the BOCs to provide enhanced services only through corpo-
rate affiliates fully separated from their basic regulatory service
operations. This was a way to stop the BOCs from cross-subsi-
dizing, misallocating joint and common costs, and discriminating
against competitors through control of the local exchange. Non-
structural safeguards allowed in the Computer III regulations
the provision of enhanced services.' 54 These safe-
guards were designed to "[p]rotect against both dis-
crimination against competing enhanced service
providers (ESPs) and cross-subsidization of BOC en-
hanced services by basic service offerings.' 55 The
BOCs complained that structural separation imposed
significant interest costs because the BOGs were
forced to maintain separate organizations and facili-
ties for operating and repairing basic and enhanced
services, thereby preventing economies of scope. 56
In order to reduce the risk of cross-subsidization,
Computer III imposed joint cost and affiliate trans-
action rules.' 57 The FCC noted that these rules have
been in place for three years and have proven effec-
tive in limiting excess rates in regulated activities
available for cross-subsidization in non-regulated
activities."'
utilize strict cost accounting and Open Network Architecture
rules to prevent common carriers from anticompetitive activities
in the provision of enhanced services. ONA rules require the
BOCs to unbundle their network service offerings so that other
enhanced service providers can select and pay for only those fea-
tures and facilities needed to create their enhanced service offer-
ings. The rules also prohibit the BOCs from price discrimina-
tion, forcing them to offer the unbundled services at the same
cost to all customers. See id. at 85-86.
155 In re Computer III, 6 FCC Rcd. at para. 1.
'8 The California court and the FCC agreed with these ar-
guments. See id. at paras. 8-9; see also California v. FCC, 905
F.2d at 1231. The FCC has also promulgated rules that require
the largest LECs to offer expanded interconnection by allowing
competitors to connect directly in LEC central facilities. In re
Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Fa-
cilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
7 FCC Rcd. 7369 (1992). This Order allows Competitive Access
Providers ("CAPs"), who have entered the access market to
serve the needs of communications-intensive companies mostly in
metropolitan areas, to directly offer competitive services to cus-
tomers without those customers paying duplicate charges for the
CAP provider and LEC access charges. Id. paras. 4-7. The FCC
believes that this Order will increase competition in the inter-
state special access market, increase LEC incentive for efficiency,
encourage the development and deployment of new technologies,
increase LEC responsiveness to customers, and increase choices
to customers who may values redundancy and route diversity. Id.
para. 14.
157 In re Computer III, 6 FCC Rcd. at para. 15; see also id.
para. 17 ("[U]nder the Commission's cost allocation rules, costs
are directly assigned to regulated or non regulated activities
whenever possible."). Additionally, these joint cost rules require
the BOCs to file cost allocation manuals and obtain and file au-
dits by independent accounting firms and utilize generally ac-
cepted accounting principals. Id. paras. 17-18. The FCC also
implemented an Automated Reporting and Management Infor-
mation System to gain benchmark comparisons of costs among
large local exchange carriers ("LECs") across time. Id. para. 20.
158 See id. paras. 21-24 (listing various rule-making and en-
forcement actions taken by the FCC).
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To deter discrimination against a BOC's competi-
tors, the FCC implemented rules that required the
BOC to provide "ESP competitors with 'equal ac-
cess' interconnections to basic network services at the
same rates that the BOCs themselves paid." '159 ONA
rules require the BOCs to unbundle basic service
building blocks in order to offer competitors only
those services needed. The BOCs must file quarterly
nondiscrimination reports describing installation,
maintenance, quality and reliability of the unbun-
dled services provided to competitors. The FCC's
rules also require the BOCs to disclose, in a timely
manner, network information relating to new or
modified network services affecting the interconnec-
tion of enhanced services.16
Although the Computer III regulations are new,
the FCC argues that they will perform a prevent-
ative role and enable the FCC to discover and im-
pose sanctions against anticompetitive activity. The
Commission points to disallowing rate increases, an
action it brought against NYNEX for improper af-
filiate transactions with a non-regulated affiliate, and
other corrective activities against violations of cost
accounting rules as proof of its ability to prevent an-
ticompetitive activities.1 ' Congress has also recently
increased the FCC's statutory authority to assess for-
feitures for accounting rule violations. 62
3. Balancing the Competing Arguments
Even though they are regulated under the strong
arm of the Concent Decree, the RBOCs have contin-
ued to behave anticompetitively. An evaluation of the
FCC's successful enforcement actions only reinforces
Judge Greene's argument that the RBOCs have an
economic incentive to violate and evade regulatory
and enforcement efforts. For example, DOJ recently
announced a $10 million settlement with U.S. West
'9 Id. at para. 33.
As a result, the basic services used by the BOC enhanced
service operations has to be available to others on an un-
bundled basis, with technical specifications, functional ca-
pabilities, and other quality and operational characteris-
tics such as installation and maintenance times, equal to
those provided to the carrier's enhanced services.
Id.
160 Id. para. 35; see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.903 (1992).
161 See In re Computer III, 6 FCC Rcd. at 188 n.60 (listing
numerous FCC enforcement actions against New York Tele-
phone Company, New England Telephone Company, Pacific
Bell and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for violations
of FCC rules).
162 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2131.
because of violations of the Consent Decree.1 6 3 Also,
the DOJ is continuing a criminal prosecution of
NYNEX for alleged violations of the information
services restrictions of the Decree.164 Judge Greene
listed additional anticompetitive activities that the
RBOCs successfully attempted even while under the
power of the Decree.165
These arguments demonstrate that regulation and
enforcement against the RBOCs will continue to be
a difficult and unwieldy problem. Additionally, in
light of the removal of the restrictions on information
services, the end of structural enforcement regula-
tions, and continuing technical advancement, the
FCC and the DOJ face a mammoth enforcement ef-
fort even as budget constraints continue to mount.
While the new Computer III and ONA rules and
regulations appear promising, history demonstrates
that common carrier monopolies have a vast arsenal
of tools that may allow them to escape the regula-
tor's grasp.
4. Legislative Action Against the BOCs
Congress may nullify the lifting of the Consent
Decree restrictions and the new FCC regulations. A
bill authored by House Judiciary Chairman Jack
Brooks (D-Tex) and supported by newspaper,
broadcasting and cable television associations would
supersede the Consent Decree and place similar re-
strictions on RBOC entry into those lines-of-business
originally restricted by the Consent Decree. 66 While
this bill did not pass during the 1992 session, other
congressional action may attempt to prevent the
RBOCs from engaging in anticompetitive behavior.
A bill introduced by Senator Hollings (D-SC)
would allow the RBOCs to enter into the research
and manufacture of telecommunications equipment.
However, the bill requires the RBOCs to maintain
163 See Kevin R. Sullivan, Developments in Computer III
and the Modification of Final Judgment, in TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY AND REGULATION 1991, at 373-74 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Hand-
book Series No. 328, 1991). U.S. West admitted to discrimina-
tion in the provision of switching services, violations of the infor-
mation services prohibitions, and violation of the manufacturing
restrictions. Id.
164 Id. See United States v. NYNEX Corp., 788 F. Supp.
16, 17 (D.D.C. 1992).
16I See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp.
308, 320-23 (D.D.C. 1991).
166 Antitrust Reform Act of 1992, H.R. 5096, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992) (pending bill would amend the Clayton Act and




strict structural separation between the local monop-
oly and the research and manufacturing centers.' 67
Similarly, a bill introduced by Representative
Cooper (D-TN) forces the RBOCs to retain strict
structural separation when providing information
services, and imposes an extremely strict standard
that must be met before the RBOCs may provide
electronic publishing services.' 68 While these bills
failed to pass during the 1992 session, legislation re-
imposing some of the restrictions on RBOC behavior
will likely be reintroduced during the current
session.
While these bills may have a better chance of pas-
sage into law under the Clinton Administration, they
do raise some constitutional questions. A First
Amendment expert retained by the Bell Companies
to assess and publicly address these legislative initia-
tives has argued that these bills "directly burden Bell
Company speech and by their terms apply only to
the Bell Companies. Any bill imposing such condi-
tions on the Bell Companies would be open to chal-
lenge on First Amendment and separation-of-powers
principles .. ."19
5. Conclusions Concerning the BOCs and Future
Consent Decree Contests
In the most recent Consent Decree case involving
common channel signaling, the appellate court raised
the standard of review in cases where AT&T op-
posed the modification. Because AT&T is likely to
protect its interests in manufacturing and inter-
exchange services, the RBOCs will face a much
more stringent standard in future modification
requests.
The new Clinton Administration will also affect
future contests. While President Clinton appears to
take a moderate stand on business, his appointments
to the DOJ and FCC may reverse the last adminis-
tration's support for the RBOCs' entry into previ-
ously restricted lines-of-business.
167 Telecommunications Research and Manufacturing Com-
petition Act, S. 173, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also Tele-
communications Equip. Research & Manufacturing Competi-
tion, H.R. 1523, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
168 Telecommunications Act of 1991, H.R. 3515, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
169 Lawrence H. Tribe, The Constitutional Constraints on
Congressional Action in Response to the Lifting of the Ban on
Bell Company Provision of Information Services, in TELEPHONE
COMPANY PROVISION OF CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE 1991, at
73 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop-
erty Course Handbook Series No. 331, 1991).
B. The Impact on PanAmSat
The appellate court held that Comsat's immunity
did not extend to anticompetitive conduct in its sepa-
rate role as the sole provider of access between the
global satellite system and United States communica-
tions common carriers.'70 The court warned PanAm-
Sat to restrict its amended complaint to actionable
conduct by Comsat as a common carrier.17 ' Alpha
Lyracom has filed an amended complaint in its ac-
tion against Comsat. PanAmSat charged Comsat
with restricting competition to the international sat-
ellite consortium.17 Specifically, the amended com-
plaint accuses Comsat of attempting or conspiring to
monopolize the commercial satellite transmission of
telecommunications signals to and from the United
States.17
3
However, PanAmSat's need to bring this antitrust
suit is becoming moot. PanAmSat has now become
the first independent international satellite telecom-
munications provider. Its aggressive chairman and
sole proprietor, Rene Anselmo, has launched one
satellite and currently has three more approved for
launch in 1994 and 1995. PanAmSat is now provid-
ing telecommunications services internationally
among three continents and is poised to give Comsat
its first real competition. PanAmSat has paved the
way for other independent satellite companies to
start up. Orion Satellite Corporation and Columbia
Communications Corporation should be on line by
1994 or 1995. One private satellite corporation exec-
utive estimates that by 1995, twenty percent of the
international satellite communications may be car-
ried by independent satellite carriers. 74 In the face
of an impending explosion of competition in the pro-
vision of international satellite services and capacity,
PanAmSat is poised to become an industry innovator
and leader.
But PanAmSat refuses to pause in its attack on
Comsat. PanAmSat has recently asked the FCC to
remove Comsat's competitive services from antitrust
protection.' 5 PanAmSat wants the FCC to sharpen
... See Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 175 (2d Cir.
1991).
171 Id.
172 PanAmSat Continues Legal Assault on Comsat: Files
Amended Appeal, SATELLITE NEWS, Nov. 18, 1991, at 1-2.
173 See id.
174 Dawn Hayes & Karen Lynch, International Satellite
Providers Look Inward to Fend Off New Competitors, CoMMU-
NICATIONS WEEK INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 21, 1992, at 22.
171 See Pan American Satellite Last Week Asked the FCC
to Remove Comsat's Competitive Services from Antitrust Protec-
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the distinction between Comsat's common carrier
services and its INTELSAT signatory functions in
order to eliminate the possibility of cross-subsidiza-
tion and discrimination. Structural separation would
make the regulation less difficult in the same way
that it has been used in other industries where tech-
nology and complexity dominate.' 76
Additionally, the FCC ruled in 1992 that inde-
pendent satellite systems such as PanAmSat will be
able to interconnect with the PSN beginning Janu-
ary 1, 1997."' In the same ruling, the FCC allowed
separate satellite systems to provide private line cir-
cuits interconnected to the PSN. 78 These new rules
will enable independent satellite systems such as
PanAmSat to truly compete with Comsat. The
broadcast networks and Turner Broadcasting have
supported PanAmSat in this application because
PanAmSat is uniquely qualified to coordinate inter-
national satellite transmissions associated with televi-
sion voice and data circuits. 79 INTELSAT agreed
in 1992 to increase the number of circuits that inde-
pendent satellite operators may interconnect to the
PSN from 100 to 1250."' This increase is per satel-
lite rather then per system, and thus amounts to a
very large expansion. Additionally, INTELSAT will
no longer consider economic harm before allowing
separate satellite systems to interconnect with the
PSN.
This rapid development in competitive interna-
tional satellite communications promises many bene-
fits for the consumer. PanAmSat already plans to of-
fer its customers packet-switched data, store-and-
forward applications and database-access services. It
also promises to offer private network services to
those entities who before were not able to afford
them by allowing customers to receive traffic with
shared earth stations connected to the PSN.' 8 '
C. The Effect of the Viacom/Time Warner
Settlement
Cable operators applauded the settlement of
Viacom and Time Warner because of the time-con-
tion, BROADCASTING, May 18, 1992, at 65.
17 See Others Join PanAmSat's Latest Salvo Against Com-
sat, COMM. DAILY, July 20, 1992, at 6.
1"7 In re Permissible Services of U.S. Licensed International
Communications Satellite Systems, Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2313,
para. 5 (1992).
178 Id.
17' Broadcast Networks and Turner Broadcasting, COMM.
DAILY, Feb. 25, 1992, at 9.
180 See Wireless plc and Hutchison Wampoon Lid., Has
suming process of responding to subpoenas. HBO
and Showtime have agreed to help reinvigorate pay
television services through a joint multi-premium
marketing campaign. Economic realities forced these
two giants of the pay television segment to resolve
their disputes. While Congress mandated private an-
titrust suits as a remedy for anticompetitive acts,
these suits consume vast amounts of a company's
time and energy. Future competition in the cable in-
dustry will be fierce. DBS, Bell Company entry into
cable, and foreign cable offerings ensure that compe-
tition in the pay television arena will stiffen. Work-
ing together, these companies may survive and flour-
ish. Fighting against each other in costly private
antitrust actions could prove fatal to both.
D. TCI and Tempo's Direct Broadcast Satellite
Grant
The FCC originally postponed Tempo's DBS
grant for four years pending the resolution of the
Missouri case involving antitrust and tortious inter-
ference claims. The FCC finally granted Tempo a
conditional DBS license in 1992 and mandated non-
discrimination in areas served by TCI or its affili-
ates. The license was conditioned on a positive out-
come of the Commission's formal complaint in the
Southern Satellite and Netlinks USA dispute," 2 and
a positive outcome of civil or criminal actions involv-
ing TCI, its principals or related entities that call
into question Tempo's qualifications to hold a DBS
authorization.
Whether the pending actions regarding TLC or
BCCI violate Tempo's DBS grant, the FCC and the
cable industry will watch TCI and Tempo closely.
The FCC listed the development of DBS service as
an important goal."8" It also noted that TCI's size
and experience could accelerate the initiation of DBS
service."8 The FCC also determined that "TCI has
enacted an extensive antitrust compliance policy and
established specific guidelines for employee behav-
ior."'" 5 The Commission trusts that "existing anti-
trust law and commission oversight are sufficient to
Opened for Service, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK INT'L, Sept. 21,
1992.
181 See U.S. Government Boost for Private International
Satellite Systems, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991.
182 See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
181 In re Application of Tempo Satellite Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2728, para. 15 (1992).
184 Id. at 2731 n.20.
185 Id. para. 6.
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prevent any conduct that is illegal or deleterious to
the DBS industry. "186
The FCC's reliance on the regulatory and pro-
phylactic measures may be misplaced. Regulation in
such a new, highly technical, rapidly advancing area
is difficult, and the FCC's own budgetary and per-
sonnel constraints add to that burden. Additionally,
TCI has not demonstrated its own restraint. Not
only did its affiliate lose a $36.5 million antitrust
and tortious interference suit in 1988, but several an-
ticompetitive complaints and accusations remain.
TCI's character detracts from Tempo's credibility in
its ability to abstain from anticompetitive behavior.
Finally, TCI's sixteen percent share of the entire na-
tional cable market, and its monopolies in many lo-
cal markets, force one to question how healthy the
market for information will become with Tempo as
a large participant.
"88 In re Application of Continental Satellite Corp., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6293, 6298 para. 51
VII. CONCLUSION
In general, public and private antitrust actions
continue to be a leading indicator of the direction of
the communications industry. Because of the ad-
vanced technology, tremendous capital investment
and economies of scale in the communications indus-
try, antitrust actions and the prophylactic threat of
antitrust actions help to maintain healthy competi-
tion. As technology advances, government-created
monopolies such as the local cable industry and IN-
TELSAT may become obsolete. However, with the
increase in global competition, government-created
consortia which escape antitrust liability such as
AMSC may become commonplace.
Lawrence D. Adashek
(1989).
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